Several news items in the past two days, taken individually, are significant. On one hand, established cross-border online brokerages like Tiger Brokers, Futu, and Changqiao are facing regulatory scrutiny and accountability; on the other hand, cryptocurrency exchanges like Binance are aggressively promoting stock trading, integrating US stocks, ETFs, stablecoins, and crypto assets into a single account system; and yet another piece of news is the State Council's announcement of the "Regulations on Outward Investment," further elevating the regulatory framework for China's outward investment. These events appear to belong to different sectors: securities regulation, cryptocurrency exchange innovation, and outward investment regulations. However, when viewed together, they all point to the same issue: the demand for overseas assets among Chinese residents is growing stronger, but legal, low-friction channels for ordinary individuals to access these assets have not opened simultaneously. This demand won't disappear due to tightened regulations; it will simply shift its focus. In the past, this channel might have been overseas brokerages; now, it's likely to be stablecoins. The closure of old channels doesn't mean the impulse to buy overseas assets has vanished. For over a decade, mainland Chinese residents have often relied on a familiar path to buy US and Hong Kong stocks: download an overseas brokerage app, submit identity information, open an account, deposit funds through an overseas account or other means, and then start buying stocks, funds, and options. This model worked not because it lacked regulatory risk, but because it was convenient and met the genuine needs of a segment of users. Chinese investors do have a need for global asset allocation. Many aren't inherently inclined to break the law; they simply see the rise of Nvidia, the rise of AI, and the wealth stories constantly being created in sectors like aerospace, energy, chips, and robotics, and then look back at their own assets, inevitably feeling anxious. The problem is, the legal path isn't smooth. For ordinary individuals, directly, freely, and at low cost, exchanging RMB for USD to buy stocks in overseas markets is not a simple matter. Convenient foreign exchange purchase quotas are not free investment quotas; the regulatory stance has always been clear: individuals cannot freely use foreign exchange purchases for overseas securities investment, real estate purchases, or other capital account purposes. Therefore, overseas online brokerages once absorbed a significant portion of this demand. However, regulators are now beginning to re-examine this approach. It's not just about where the platform is registered, where the servers are located, or where trades are matched; it's about more practical questions: Where are the customers? Where is the marketing? Where is the account opening guidance? Where is the customer service? Where do trading orders come from? Where do funds go in and out?If an overseas platform has long served mainland Chinese users through Chinese-language pages, Chinese customer service, Chinese-language communities, KOLs (Key Opinion Leaders), and commission-based agency services, it's difficult for it to completely eliminate risk simply by stating "I am an overseas entity." Therefore, the investigations of Tiger Brokers, Futu, and Changqiao are not just about a few companies facing trouble. It's more like a signal: the gray-area cross-border securities service model of "persons in China, platforms overseas, and business conducted through apps" is entering a period of cleanup. However, this doesn't mean the demand for buying overseas stocks will disappear. After the old channels are cleared, the real question is: where will this demand flow? Stablecoins are becoming a new intermediary layer for funds. The answer is likely stablecoins. In the past, buying US stocks involved at least several steps: bank foreign exchange purchases, overseas remittances, brokerage deposits, fund usage verification, and account review. Each step may not necessarily stop you, but it reminds you that this is a cross-border financial transaction. Now, the path is changing. A person can first use RMB to buy USDT or USDC, then transfer the stablecoin to an overseas exchange, brokerage, or stock trading platform. Within the same app, they can then buy US stocks, ETFs, and even tokenized stocks, stock-linked certificates, and on-chain RWA products in the future. Operationally, it becomes very similar to a regular asset exchange. The user sees it as: "I just bought Nvidia with USDT." However, regulators see a different picture: Is RMB capital flowing out of the country through virtual asset channels? Is it circumventing foreign exchange usage restrictions? Is it participating in unlicensed overseas securities services? Have the returns been declared and taxed? Can the source and destination of the funds be explained? This is the unique position of stablecoins in this issue. It's not just a payment tool, nor simply a unit of account for crypto assets. It's becoming a funding intermediary layer for Chinese residents allocating overseas assets. The most troublesome aspect of this intermediary layer is that it breaks up the originally relatively complete regulatory chain. RMB transfer is one segment, buying USDT is another, on-chain transfer is yet another, depositing funds into an exchange is a third, buying stocks is yet another, and converting future returns back to RMB is yet another. Each segment, viewed individually, seems to have some explanation; but taken together, it constitutes a de facto cross-border asset allocation. Stablecoins didn't create this demand; they merely provided it with a low-friction, highly concealed, and globalized channel for the first time. The smoother this channel, the tighter the regulation. The wealth effect will push more and more people down this path. This issue cannot be viewed solely from a regulatory perspective; it must also be considered from a human perspective. Recently, overseas markets have been very adept at storytelling.AI, chips, aerospace, energy, quantum computing, robotics—these terms create new possibilities for imagination every day. Many Chinese investors, even those unfamiliar with these industries, quickly form a simplistic judgment: opportunities seem to be all overseas. Coupled with the amplifying effect of social media, stories of making money are constantly shared, while stories of risk are often ignored. As a result, many people's mindset becomes: I don't want to break the law, I'm just afraid of missing out. I don't want to launder money, I just want to allocate some assets overseas. I don't want to evade taxes, I just think everyone else is doing it. I'm not a professional investor, but I can't just watch global asset prices rise without affecting me. This mindset is very real, but also very dangerous. What many individual investors truly underestimate is that they think they're just buying a little USDT or US stocks, but they're actually entering a complex regulatory loop. A platform's willingness to perform KYC doesn't mean Chinese regulators approve of this path. An exchange allowing you to trade doesn't mean your funds leaving the country are compliant. Profits not being repatriated doesn't mean there are no tax obligations. Small amounts don't mean there's no risk of frozen accounts, risk control measures, or investigations. And everyone else doing it doesn't mean there are no problems. When the market is hot, many people are most likely to mistake liquidity for security. Being able to buy doesn't equate to legality; being able to withdraw doesn't equate to cleanliness; being able to profit doesn't equate to being able to explain things clearly later. What regulators are truly worried about isn't stocks, but the loss of control over the capital chain. This issue cannot be simply interpreted as "regulators preventing individuals from buying US stocks." What regulators are truly worried about is that stablecoins are simultaneously intertwining four systems. First is foreign exchange management. China's capital account is not fully open. Individuals buying stablecoins with RMB and then using them to enter overseas stock, ETF, fund, and tokenized securities markets may essentially be circumventing traditional bank foreign exchange purchases and overseas remittance reviews. Second is securities regulation. If overseas brokerages, cryptocurrency exchanges, and stock tokenization platforms provide services such as account opening, marketing, trading, customer service, fund transfers, and commission rebates to mainland Chinese users, they may be involved in illegal cross-border securities operations. Regulators look at the substantive service chain, not just whether a platform holds a certain overseas license. Third is tax regulation. The foreign income of Chinese tax residents does not automatically disappear simply because the money remains overseas, the account is opened overseas, or the income is denominated in a stable currency.The real issues lie in whether individuals have truthfully declared their assets, how costs are proven, how profits are calculated, whether taxes already paid overseas can be credited, and whether future account information will be exchanged through international tax transparency mechanisms. Fourthly, there's anti-money laundering regulation. Stablecoins are too easily transferable and too prone to attracting high-risk funds. An ordinary person might buy USDT simply to buy stocks, but the USDT they receive could originate from online gambling, telecom fraud, Ponzi schemes, scams, sanctioned addresses, or other illicit channels. Only when their bank cards are frozen, exchange accounts restricted, and judicial authorities demand an explanation of the source of funds do they realize they weren't on a clean financial pipeline. This is the real complexity of using stablecoins to buy US stocks. It's not a simple matter of "investment freedom," but rather a complex interplay of foreign exchange, securities, taxation, anti-money laundering, personal information, and the transparency of overseas assets. The regulatory task isn't to address a single platform, stock, or stablecoin, but rather to rediscover the dismantled financial chain. The biggest risk for individuals is the inability to explain themselves later. When many people ask these kinds of questions, their primary concern is: Will I be in trouble? This question cannot be answered simply. If it's just a small, occasional allocation of personal funds to overseas assets, the first issues to surface are usually account risk control, tax reporting, explanation of the source of funds, and administrative compliance risks. However, if the activity continues, the risks can quickly escalate. For example, helping others buy or sell USD; frequently brokering RMB and stablecoin exchanges; profiting from exchange rate differences or fees; using multiple bank cards to split payments; using fictitious trade or services to disguise the purpose of funds; assisting others in converting domestic funds into overseas USD assets; knowingly or should have known that the source of funds is abnormal, yet still continuing to participate in payments and transfers. At this point, it's no longer a story of "I bought some US stocks." It could become issues of illegal currency exchange, underground banking, illegal business operations, money laundering, or even concealing or disguising the proceeds of crime. What truly drags individuals into criminal risk is often not the purchase of overseas stocks, but rather unknowingly becoming someone else's financial conduit. The same applies to tax issues. Many people mistakenly believe that as long as overseas assets don't return to their home country, no one will know; as long as the exchange is located overseas, there are no reporting issues; and as long as the returns are in stablecoins, they don't count as income. These understandings are dangerous. Global tax transparency and information exchange mechanisms for crypto assets will undoubtedly continue to advance. Overseas brokerage accounts, bank accounts, custodian accounts, and fund accounts are becoming increasingly transparent, and crypto asset accounts will not remain a regulatory blind spot forever.At that time, the biggest problem for individuals may not be "what they have bought," but rather: Where did the principal come from? How did the money leave the country? How are the costs of buying and selling proven? Were the returns declared? Do the balances in overseas accounts match the level of income in China? Have they been handling funds for others? Have they been exposed to contaminated funds? Financial regulation often doesn't just look at a single action, but at whether you can clearly explain the whole story. A clear explanation doesn't necessarily mean low risk; a unclear explanation certainly doesn't guarantee low risk. In the future, it won't be that no one can buy overseas assets, but rather that the channels will become increasingly stratified. I don't believe that future regulation will simply and crudely suppress all overseas investment demand. It's unrealistic and doesn't align with the global trend of asset allocation for Chinese enterprises and residents. What's more likely is a stratification of channels. Compliant funds will continue to use licensed securities firms, QDII, cross-border wealth management, licensed institutions in Hong Kong and Singapore, compliant funds, family offices, and offshore trusts. These paths are more costly, have higher thresholds, require more documentation, and are slower, but at least the source of funds, investment status, tax declaration, and regulatory boundaries are relatively clear. Gray market funds will continue to flow into stablecoins, OTC markets, overseas exchanges, tokenized stocks, on-chain wallets, and offshore accounts. This route is faster, lighter, more covert, and also more prone to sudden collapses at certain points. What regulators will truly be focusing on next is not every small individual investment, but rather several key links: domestic marketing entry points, OTC deposits and withdrawals, underground banks, fraudulent trade, commission-based agents, platforms providing unapproved cross-border financial services to domestic residents, and large, high-frequency, and abnormal stablecoin fund flows. Therefore, for individuals, the future question is not "Can I still buy?", but rather: Through which channel do you buy? With what money? Who provides the service? Is your source of funds clean? Have you declared your returns? Have you transferred funds for others? Can you provide a complete explanation if questioned? For platforms, the future question is not as simple as "Do they have overseas licenses?", but rather: Do they have mainland Chinese users? Do they offer Chinese-language marketing? Do they have domestic agents? Do they assist with account opening? Do they process trading orders? Do they facilitate fund inflows and outflows? Does a platform knowingly continue to provide targeted services despite having a large number of domestic users? These questions will determine whether a platform is engaging in global financial innovation or conducting illegal cross-border business in the eyes of Chinese regulators.Finally, looking at the issue of using stablecoins to buy US stocks, what appears to be a product innovation actually represents a new conflict between the global asset allocation needs of Chinese residents and the regulatory boundaries of capital account transactions. The cleanup of older cross-border brokerages is only the first half. The second half, where cryptocurrency exchanges take over from stock trading, is far more complex. This time, funds are no longer simply flowing from banks to brokerages, but from RMB to stablecoins, from stablecoins to overseas markets, and then back to the blockchain. The more convenient this path, the more attractive it will be; the more bustling this path, the more it will attract regulatory attention. Between wealth opportunities and regulatory boundaries, stablecoins have opened an underground highway. Those who run the fastest may not be the first to reach their destination; they may also be the first to hit roadblocks. [Shao Jiadian]