Global capital is facing three major signals. Amid the interplay between monetary and productivity anchors, global capital is seeking a "second channel" beyond the primary dollar channel, building more flexible and diversified supplementary allocations through cross-border allocation, digital finance, and the synergy of real asset capabilities. Over the past week, global asset markets have released three noteworthy signals almost simultaneously. On one hand, the Federal Reserve is entering a new leadership cycle. On May 22, 2026, Kevin Warsh will be officially sworn in as Chairman of the Federal Reserve. The swearing-in ceremony will take place in the East Room of the White House, presided over by President Trump, who publicly stated his desire for the new chairman to remain "completely independent." On the other hand, the AI capital expenditure cycle continues its rapid expansion. Nvidia's latest financial report shows that revenue reached $81.6 billion in the first quarter of fiscal year 2027, a year-on-year increase of 85%, with its data center business continuing to break records. The market is beginning to realize that AI may not just be a technology theme, but is gradually becoming a new variable influencing global asset pricing. Meanwhile, the US Treasury market is also releasing new signals. The 10-year Treasury yield rose to 4.58%, and the 30-year yield once approached 5%. Inflation expectations, fiscal pressures, geopolitical risks, and policy uncertainties are collectively driving global funds to reassess the risk-return structure of dollar-denominated sovereign assets. These three seemingly unrelated factors actually point to the same question: when monetary credibility, productivity expectations, and risk-free asset pricing all undergo marginal changes, will global capital continue to rely solely on the dollar's allocation logic? More and more cross-border funds are beginning to consider a practical question: in addition to the main dollar channel, is it necessary to establish a more diversified and flexible "second channel"? I. The Real Test of the Warsh Era: The Political Discount of Dollar Credibility On the surface, Warsh's appointment is a personnel change. But what the market is truly concerned about is never just whether future interest rate meetings will choose to cut or raise rates. The deeper question is: how will the Federal Reserve's institutional credibility be reinterpreted and priced in the new political cycle? As a former Federal Reserve governor and a long-time participant in Republican economic policy discussions, Warsh's resume naturally places him within the framework of discussions on "monetary policy independence." Therefore, his appointment is not only a personnel arrangement but also an important window for the market to observe the logic of US policy governance. It is worth noting that when "independence" needs to be publicly and repeatedly emphasized, the market often makes a natural association: Is institutional credibility entering a stage where it needs to be proven more? For global multi-strategy capital, this marginal change may trigger a reassessment in three dimensions. First, is the path of the US dollar interest rate still entirely dominated by economic fundamentals?If monetary policy space is increasingly influenced by political cycles, fiscal pressures, or growth targets, then interest rate expectations may begin to incorporate new risk compensation logic. Second, will US Treasuries maintain their traditional pricing advantage? For a long time, global capital has been willing to hold US Treasuries at relatively low yields, reflecting not only recognition of the size of the US economy but also trust in the independence of the Federal Reserve and the long-term purchasing power of the dollar. When this trust enters a more complex discussion environment, market demands for risk compensation may also change. Third, will global capital increase its demand for diversified allocation channels? This does not mean the dollar system will be abandoned. The dollar remains the world's most liquid and liquid reserve currency. However, in an environment of rising uncertainty, more and more funds are beginning to consider: besides the main dollar channel, is it necessary to establish more supplementary allocation paths? In other words, what the market is truly re-examining in the Warsh era may not only be interest rate policy itself, but also the governance logic and institutional signals behind the dollar's credibility. II. Macroeconomic Metaphors in Nvidia's Financial Report: The "Dual Anchor Game" of Currency Anchor and Productivity Anchor. AI is undoubtedly one of the most watched topics in the current global market. However, much discussion remains at the level of industry, valuation, or technological competition. From a broader perspective, AI is bringing about more than just a technological cycle; it's creating a new variable in asset pricing. Nvidia's $81.6 billion in revenue and 85% year-over-year growth in a single quarter not only indicate that the AI industry chain remains in a high-growth phase but also signify the continued expansion of global capital expenditure around computing power, chips, data centers, power systems, and infrastructure construction. Behind this lies a core contradiction in the current market: the short-term and long-term effects of AI may correspond to entirely different macroeconomic outcomes. In the short term, what does AI mean? It means accelerated data center construction, expanded electricity demand, increased procurement of high-end chips, and upgrades to network infrastructure. These investments will drive up capital expenditure and may also increase some energy and hardware costs. From a macroeconomic perspective, AI does not inherently mean deflation in the short term; it may even bring about a new round of "investment inflation." However, the long-term logic is entirely different. If AI can ultimately significantly improve production efficiency, reduce unit costs, and optimize resource allocation and labor productivity, then it may become a long-term deflationary force. Improved corporate efficiency, increased automation, and decreased marginal costs could all reshape global growth and inflation paths over a longer period. The real question is: the market is still uncertain, and it's unclear which phase will arrive first.Investment has already occurred, but the productivity dividend has not yet been fully realized, and a new time mismatch is emerging between the capital recovery cycle and the market pricing cycle. This also means that the logic of global capital pricing is beginning to change. For many years, the core anchor of the global market has been the monetary anchor—how the Federal Reserve prices interest rates, and asset markets have often adjusted around this logic. But today, the market is forming a second anchor: the productivity anchor. Can AI really drive global productivity growth? When will efficiency improvements begin to be explicitly reflected in corporate profits and pricing systems? Will companies ultimately raise or lower prices because of AI? These questions still have no standard answers. But the market has already begun to price this "productivity anchor" in advance through Nvidia's financial reports, the performance of tech stocks, and the continuous escalation of global computing power competition. Therefore, the challenge facing the Warsh era may not just be "whether to cut or raise interest rates." A more complex reality is that the monetary anchor and the productivity anchor are simultaneously influencing global asset pricing. On one hand, rising US Treasury yields reflect a demand for higher risk compensation. On the other hand, the long-term productivity expectations brought by AI continue to support the growth logic. Under the dual-anchor game, the traditional global asset allocation framework is losing its single answer. III. US Treasury Yields: When "Risk-Free Assets" Begin to Be Reassessed. If the Warsh era represented a heated discussion on institutional credit, and AI represented a reconstruction of productivity expectations, then the changes in US Treasury yields are more like a direct pricing feedback from the market. The 10-year US Treasury yield touched 4.58%, and the 30-year yield once approached 5%. This may not just be a short-term technical fluctuation, but more likely reflects that global funds are reassessing the risk-reward relationship of dollar sovereign assets. Behind this change, there are at least three overlapping factors. First, inflation expectations remain uncertain. Geopolitical risks may push up energy prices. AI capital expenditures may bring new investment demand. The interaction between supply chains, fiscal spending, and the growth cycle also makes the market cautious about the future inflation path. Second, fiscal pressure is becoming an increasingly difficult variable to ignore. The longer the high-interest-rate environment lasts, the greater the financing cost pressure on the US government. The relationship between fiscal deficits, debt size, and interest payments is also beginning to become an issue of continuous concern for long-term investors. Third, policy and governance risks are entering a more complex pricing framework. The path of monetary policy, changes in the geopolitical environment, policy coordination capabilities, and market expectations of institutional stability can all affect capital's risk requirements for dollar assets.More importantly, this change represents more than just the yield figures themselves. In the past, US Treasuries were long considered a core global safe-haven asset not only because of the sheer size of the US economy, but also because the market believed they possessed sufficient liquidity, institutional stability, and a long-term credit foundation. Today, however, global capital is re-discussing whether the definition of "safe assets" needs to be reinterpreted in the new macroeconomic environment. This doesn't mean US Treasuries have lost their core status, but it does mean the market may be demanding clearer and more adequate risk compensation. For cross-border capital, this also raises an increasingly real question: as core assets themselves enter a reassessment cycle, will diversified allocation capabilities gradually shift from "optional" to "basic"? IV. What kind of "second channel" is global capital seeking? If the core logic of global capital allocation over the past decade has been "entering the dollar system," then today, a more realistic question is emerging: how to build more supplementary allocation capabilities outside the main dollar channel? This doesn't mean abandoning the dollar. The dollar remains the most liquid and widely accepted reserve currency system globally. However, in an environment where interest rate cycles, productivity cycles, fiscal cycles, and geopolitical cycles intersect, more and more funds are beginning to realize that a single allocation logic may not be able to cover all risk and return needs. Thus, a new question arises: what exactly does the so-called "second channel" mean? It's not a single product, nor is it simply a concept of overseas investment. More accurately, it's a set of cross-market allocation capabilities centered around funds, assets, and returns. First, it's about how funds can flow more flexibly. Against the backdrop of increased global market volatility and constantly changing asset pricing, capital is increasingly emphasizing the efficiency of switching between cross-markets, multiple currencies, and multiple assets. This requires funds not only to "go global" but also to possess a higher level of compliance, liquidity, and allocation flexibility. Second, it's about how assets can be more effectively understood and allocated across borders. For a long time, barriers to asset recognition and liquidity have existed between different markets. How to make high-quality industrial assets, financial assets, or digital assets more widely recognized, understood, and priced by global capital is becoming a new challenge. The development of RWA (Real-World Asset Tokenization), cross-border fund structures, structured products, and digital financial infrastructure is also exploring this direction. Finally, it's about how returns can form a truly sustainable closed loop.The competition in cross-border asset allocation ultimately lies not only in "whether allocation is possible," but also in: whether a stable, sustainable, and cyclical return structure can be established after allocation. This means that risk management, liquidity arrangements, clearing capabilities, hedging systems, and cross-market operational capabilities will all become crucial infrastructure. From this perspective, the core of the "second channel" discussion is no longer just about asset allocation. It is gradually evolving into: how global capital can construct the next generation of cross-border allocation frameworks. V. Why are many institutions reconsidering Hong Kong? When global capital begins to think about the "second channel," a question naturally arises: why is more and more discussion returning to Hong Kong? There may be more than one answer. First, Hong Kong remains one of the few important markets globally that simultaneously connects the international dollar system and RMB capital flows. This two-way connectivity gives it a unique position in cross-border capital allocation, offshore financial arrangements, and international capital coordination. Second, Hong Kong possesses a mature international legal system, capital market mechanisms, and long-established financial infrastructure. For institutional funds, rule transparency, clearing systems, legal certainty, and cross-border enforcement capabilities are often just as important as the yield itself. More importantly, Hong Kong is becoming an important testing ground for digital assets and asset digitization regulatory frameworks. Over the past year, Hong Kong's financial regulatory environment has gradually entered a more defined development stage. Stablecoin systems, digital asset licensing systems, and RWA regulatory exploration have continued to advance. Meanwhile, major financial markets such as the US, EU, and Singapore are also continuously improving their relevant regulatory frameworks. This means that the development logic of global digital finance is gradually moving from "regulatory uncertainty" to a new stage of "regulatory clarity." In this context, the truly noteworthy issue is no longer whether digital assets will become part of long-term financial infrastructure, but rather: after the rules become clearer, who can build sustainable business models, asset capabilities, and cross-border service systems? From this perspective, Hong Kong is attempting to upgrade its role. It is no longer just a traditional financing window, but is evolving into an "interface market" connecting cross-border funds, traditional finance, and digital asset capabilities. VI. From Channel to Closed Loop: Cross-border Alternative Asset Management is Entering a "Three-Dimensional Capability Competition" If the "second channel" is becoming a new topic of discussion in global capital markets, then the question becomes more specific: what kind of institutions can truly participate in this new cross-border allocation logic? The answer may not lie in a single capability.In the new macroeconomic environment, competition among cross-border alternative asset management platforms is shifting from single-point advantages to systemic capability competition. Generally, a sustainable cross-border asset allocation framework requires at least three capabilities working in tandem. First, real asset capability: the ability to identify, operate, and manage high-quality assets with a long-term value foundation. Whether it's industrial assets, urban assets, or physical assets with stable cash flow, the core is that the asset itself must possess a verifiable value logic and a long-term operational foundation. Second, digital finance capability: how to improve asset allocation efficiency and return management capabilities through structured design, quantitative systems, digital asset representation, and risk management capabilities. As digital financial infrastructure matures, the way assets and returns are organized is also changing. Third, cross-border financial capability: enabling assets not only to exist but also to be understood, allocated, priced, and traded by global capital. This means that legal frameworks, cross-border product design, risk isolation mechanisms, liquidation arrangements, and compliance capabilities will all become significant hurdles. These three capabilities do not exist independently. The real challenge lies in whether they can form a complete closed loop. From this perspective, some institutions have begun to attempt to build a more comprehensive practical path. Taking Deutsche Bank's exploration as an example, it attempts to develop a collaborative layout around three layers of capabilities: On the industrial side, relying on long-term experience in operating physical assets, it continuously focuses on the value identification of core urban assets and industrial cash flow. On the digital finance side, through systematic quantitative strategies, asset structure design, and digital expression, it explores richer ways of organizing returns. On the cross-border finance side, it leverages structured products, traditional financial instruments, and international architecture design to improve the efficiency of connections between assets and global capital markets. Its goal is not merely to establish a capital flow path, but to attempt to form a more complete cross-border closed loop: capital inflow → asset matching → return generation → multi-market return. The reason why this model is difficult to replicate is not only due to technology or product design. More importantly, it requires the joint support of long-term asset operation capabilities, cross-domain financial experience, organizational collaboration capabilities, and a complete compliance system. And these capabilities often cannot be established in a short period of time. Conclusion: The Warsh era is not just a change of leadership at the Federal Reserve. AI capital expenditure is not just another story of growth in the technology industry. Similarly, changes in US Treasury yields are not just a number in market fluctuations. These signals, taken together, may reflect the same trend: global capital is reassessing its allocation logic.Monetary credit, productivity expectations, and risk compensation mechanisms are simultaneously entering a new pricing phase. In this environment, the "second channel" may not necessarily mean a replacement for the dollar system. More likely, it signifies that global capital is beginning to establish a more flexible, diversified, and adaptable supplementary allocation framework to complex cycles. The evolution of Hong Kong's regulatory framework, the development of digital financial infrastructure, and the maturation of cross-border alternative asset management capabilities are all likely to be important components of this trend. Future competition may no longer be simply about who owns more assets, but rather about who better understands the new logic of capital flows and who can better build synergistic capabilities across markets, currencies, and assets. In this new cycle, allocation capability itself may be becoming one of the most important capabilities. [German Singularity Technology]